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Abstract 
Background: Hospitals face an increasing pressure towards efficiency and cost reduction while 
ensuring patient safety. This warrants a closer examination of the trade-off between production and 
protection posited in the literature for a high-risk hospital setting (intensive care). 
Purposes: Based on extant literature and concepts on both safety management and 
organizational/safety culture, this study investigates to which extent production pressure (i.e., 
increased staff workload and capacity utilization) and safety culture (consisting of safety climate 
among staff and safety tools implemented by management) influence the occurrence of medical 
errors and if/how safety climate and safety tools interact. 
Methodology/Approach: A prospective, observational, 48-hour cross-sectional study was 
conducted in 57 intensive care units. The dependent variable is the incidence of errors affecting 
those 378 patients treated throughout the entire observation period. Capacity utilization and 
workload were measured by indicators such as unit occupancy,  
nurse-/physician-to-patient ratios, levels of care, or NEMS scores. The safety tools considered 
include Critical Incidence Reporting Systems, audits, training, mission statements, 
SOPs/checklists and the use of barcodes. Safety climate was assessed using a psychometrically 
validated four-dimensional questionnaire. Linear regression was employed to identify the effects 
of the predictor variables on error rate, as well as interaction effects between safety tools and 
safety climate. 
Findings: Higher workload has a detrimental effect on safety while safety climate – unlike the 
examined safety tools – has a virtually equal opposite effect. Correlations between safety tools and 
safety climate as well as their interaction effects on error rate are mostly nonsignificant. 
Practice Implications: Increased workload and capacity utilization increase the occurrence of 
medical error; an effect that can be offset by a positive safety climate but not by formally 
implemented safety procedures and policies. 
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Introduction 
Reducing the number of medical errors as a means of improving patient safety has been in the 
spotlight for over a decade now (e.g., Kohn, Corrigan, & Donaldson, 2000). At the same time, 
hospitals, like other high-hazard industries, face the basic dilemma of “production versus 
protection” (Reason, 1997, p. 4), i.e., providing quick and (cost-)effective treatment while ensuring 
patient safety and avoiding medical errors. In addition, pressure on hospitals towards efficiency 
and cost reduction has risen over the last years (Hsieh, Clement, & Bazzoli, 2010), with potentially 
detrimental effects on safety (Hansez & Chmiel, 2010) as well as error-induced cost (van den Bos 
et al., 2011). 
One central determinant of medical error prevention consists in so-called safety culture 
(Naveh, Katz-Navon, & Stern, 2005), which is defined by a pioneer source as “the product of 
individual and group values, attitudes, perceptions, competencies and patterns of behavior that 
determine the commitment to, and the style and proficiency of, an organisation’s safety 
management” (International Safety Advisory Group, 1991, p. 23). A related construct is safety 
climate, which refers primarily to “the shared perceptions of employees concerning the degree to 
which safety is a top priority for employees within the organization” (Naveh, Katz-Navon, & 
Stern, 2011, p. 57). 
Referring to the distinction made by Reason (1997) between error management tools (p. 130) 
and safety climate in the sense of shared values and attitudes (p. 194), we distinguish between two 
elements of safety culture – the abovementioned shared perceptions and attitudes concerning 
safety, hence termed safety climate (SC) and tangible, formalized safety procedures and tools (e.g., 
Critical Incident Reporting Systems (CIRS), checklists, barcodes, safety audits, or mission 
statements), hence termed safety tools (ST). This distinction between SC and ST is not always 
made in extant literature, with some authors seeing observable safety features as a part of safety 
climate both in theory on organizational culture and climate and empirical studies in healthcare 
and other fields (e.g., Katz-Navon, Naveh, & Stern, 2005; Neal, Griffin, & Hart, 2000; Ostroff, 
Kinicki, & Tamkins, 2003). Indeed, some ST like safety audits and mission statements are 
arguably quite closely related to the perception- and attitude-centered notion of safety climate, 
while others (e.g., checklists and barcodes) represent a much more tangible and procedural aspect 
of work design. One central distinction from SC, however, is that from a management perspective, 
all ST can be formally designed and implemented. 
This difference applies to several similar distinctions in related fields, too, like that between 
hard and soft aspects of Total Quality Management (e.g., Wilkinson, Redman, Snape, & 
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Marchington, 1998) and/or organizational culture (e.g., the 7S-model, with strategy, structure and 
systems as “hard” aspects and skills, style, staff, and shared values as “soft” aspects; e.g., 
Waterman, Peters, & Phillips, 1980). It also relates to two different approaches to safety 
management in health care, where Neal et al. (2000) differentiate between safety compliance, 
which “involves adhering to safety procedures and carrying out work in a safe manner”, and safety 
participation consisting of “helping coworkers, promoting the safety program within the 
workplace, demonstrating initiative, and putting effort into improving safety in the workplace” 
(p. 101). In a similar vein, Khatri et al. (2006) contrast control-based management with 
commitment-based management. The former is characterized, among other things, by an 
“emphasis on compliance/obedience” (p. 119) and a “bureaucratic, rule-based culture” (p. 125), 
aiming at regulation and standardization by a centralized quality department (Khatri, Brown, & 
Hicks, 2009). By contrast, commitment-based management attaches importance to communication 
and teamwork, and makes “quality and safety issues permeate the entire organization” (Khatri et 
al., 2009, p. 318). In spite of all these dichotomies represented by the mentioned concepts, these 
aspects (climate vs. tools, soft vs. hard, control/compliance vs. commitment/participation) are 
arguably not mutually exclusive, which raises the question to what extent the potential effects of 
these approaches are independent, antagonistic or mutually reinforcing. 
Based on these considerations, our study investigates the following research questions: 
1) How strongly does production pressure (reflected in higher capacity utilization and/or staff 
workload) affect error rate? 
2) To what extent do safety tools (see above) affect error rate? 
3) To what extent do shared perceptions and attitudes among frontline staff concerning safety 
(safety climate) affect error rate? 
4) Do safety tools and safety climate interact in affecting error rate? 
In investigating these questions, our study contributes to extant research in three ways. First, 
while the effect of safety culture/climate on patient safety has been previously examined, the 
influence of staff workload/capacity utilization as factors that are thought to adversely affect 
patient safety has hitherto rarely been investigated let alone directly compared with safety 
climate/safety tools as elements of safety culture that are thought to positively affect patient safety. 
Second, it distinguishes between safety climate and safety tools as two elements of safety culture 
that represent different yet complimentary approaches to safety management and relates them to 
extant concepts of organizational and safety culture. Third, it consequently examines the main and 
interaction effects of these two elements (SC and ST) on patient safety as opposed to the influence 
of production pressure in a particularly error-prone medical specialty (intensive care). 
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Framework and hypotheses 
Regarding the abovementioned conflict between production and protection, there are several 
approaches that aim at improving both safety and efficiency via process optimization, like Six 
Sigma, Lean Healthcare etc., and while some sources suggests that the conclusion regarding the 
overall benefit of Lean Healthcare implementation is somewhat sobering (Grove, Meredith, 
MacIntyre, Angelis, & Neailey, 2006; Radnor, Holweg, & Waring, 2012), there are indeed 
successful instances in healthcare of reconciling these contradictory goals (Radnor, 2011, p. 4). 
One central determinant whether such initiatives are beneficial to patient safety or not is 
arguably whether the modified processes lead to a reduction in workload for frontline staff (e.g., 
via less red tape, smoother handovers, etc.) or rather increase workload and production pressure on 
staff in an effort to “do more with less”. Several empirical findings suggest a tendency towards the 
latter in practice (Mehri, 2006; Schön, Bergquist, & Klefsjö, 2010), suggesting that while efforts 
for increased efficiency need not necessarily lead to increased workload, in practice they 
apparently do (see also Rasmussen, 1997), and indeed the premise that production pressure 
increases the rate of medical error is corroborated by several studies (e.g., Hansez & Chmiel, 
2010; Valentin et al., 2009). Hence, our first hypothesis: 
H1: A higher degree of capacity utilization and/or workload is associated with a higher error 
rate. 
Safety-related efforts, by contrast, contribute to increased safety margins (Rasmussen, 1997, 
p. 190) and should thus reduce the occurrence of errors. While this applies to both tools and 
climate, their pathways of effectiveness are arguably different (although not mutually exclusive). 
Procedural tools like checklists and barcodes serve as “technical” barriers against errors. Those 
tools that are closer to the perception-related notion of safety climate (safety audits and mission 
statement) primarily represent an “official” and observable reflection of the prevailing safety 
climate. Finally, training and Critical Incident Reporting Systems (CIRS) emphasize the learning 
aspect of a safety culture and mainly aim at a better recognition of and appropriate response to 
identified threats to safety and/or sources of error. Indeed, the notion that safety tools reduce 
medical error is supported by empirical findings (Shojania, Duncan, McDonald, & Wachter, 2002); 
specifically for CIRS (Valentin et al., 2009), audits and mission statements (Ovretveit, 1999), or 
standard operating procedures for handovers (Catchpole et al., 2007): 
H2: Implementation of safety tools (ST) is associated with a lower error rate. 
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A good safety climate, on the other hand, establishes a priority for safety compared to 
efficiency goals (e.g., Zohar, 2000) and should thus contribute to less treatment errors as well, a 
notion supported by numerous studies (Clarke, 2006; Hofmann & Mark, 2006; Huang et al., 2010; 
Katz-Navon et al., 2005; Naveh et al., 2005, 2011; Neal & Griffin, 2006; Singer, Lin, Falwell, 
Gaba, & Baker, 2009; Vogus & Sutcliffe, 2007): 
H3: A better safety climate (SC) is associated with a lower error rate. 
Concerning the respective effectiveness of these two safety culture elements (ST vs. SC), 
several sources suggest that a formalized, control-based approach might not be as important a 
determinant of (patient) safety as an approach emphasizing shared views and social norms 
concerning safety among staff (Podgórski, 2010), which applies to the medical field, too (Khatri, 
Halbesleben, Petroski, & Meyer, 2007; Waring, 2009). In addition, compared to other high-risk 
industries, work processes in health care depend to a greater extent on the decisions and discretion 
of frontline staff, with less reliance on automation and standardization (Gaba, 2000), which further 
underlines the importance of an emphasis on safety among frontline staff for error prevention: 
H4: SC reduces medical error more than ST. 
Finally, we argue that safety tools and safety climate reinforce each other. For the “technical 
barrier” type of tools (checklists and barcodes), a good safety climate enhances compliance with 
safety procedures, strengthening their effectiveness. Safety tools that focus on learning (training 
and CIRS) provide increased knowledge and awareness about important threats and errors, adding 
to the attitudinal aspect represented by climate. Finally, safety tools that represent the observable 
complement of a good safety climate may degenerate into mere rhetoric and pretense in case of a 
weak safety climate (Naveh et al., 2011): 
H5: SC and ST interact in a mutually reinforcing way in their influence on error rate. 
Method 
Study design 
The study was conducted as a joint research project by the Austrian Center for Documentation 
and Quality Assurance in Intensive Care (ASDI), together with the Research Institute for 
Healthcare Management and complexity-research.com of Vienna University of Economics and 
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Business (WU). We drew on a sample of ICUs recruited by cooperating associations already in 
2004 (apart from the ASDI these were the German Interdisciplinary Federation of Intensive Care 
Medicine and Emergency Medicine and the Swiss Society of Intensive Care Medicine) which have 
an explicit interest in patient safety and prior experience with the recording of medical errors for 
scientific studies (Valentin et al., 2009; Valentin et al., 2006). Required sample size was estimated 
beforehand based on expected effect sizes and validity of measures. Participating units could 
choose between two possible dates on which to begin a 48-hour observation period. 
To avoid problems associated with the use of archive data (Clarke, 2006), this study used a 
prospective approach to error measurement. Medical errors that actually or potentially caused 
harm to a patient were recorded over a 48-hour period (which included change of shift for nurses 
and physicians), with safety climate measured during that time, too. To approach the problem of 
variation across specialties, we focused on a particular medical field: intensive care units (ICUs). 
Our choice was motivated by the fact that intensive care is particularly prone to error. The 
combination of complexity and potential for great harm makes it even more fraught with risk than 
other medical fields (Valentin et al., 2009). A study of ICUs therefore seemed especially well-
suited to investigating the research questions set out above. 
Sample 
The final study sample consisted of 378 patients from 57 ICUs in as many (predominantly 
larger urban) hospitals. The data obtained during observation are summarized in Table 2, in which 
the values of continuous variables are expressed as mean +/- standard deviation and those of 
categorical variables as frequencies and percentages. It is noteworthy that the overall mean NEMS 
score of 35.5 (±11.5) score points per patient suggests a high level of treatment intensity. 
Figures for the safety climate dimensions are based on responses from 549 nurses and 185 
physicians, representing response rates of 41.4% and 35.2%, respectively. Response rate standard 
deviation across ICUs is 17.7 %. ICUs with less than five respondents for the safety climate survey 
were excluded from the analyses. The mean age of respondents was 37.5 (±9.2) years and their 
mean professional experience 14.4 (±8.7) years. Some 17% of respondents had managerial 
functions. The following results are based on those 378 patients who remained in an ICU 
throughout the entire observation period. An analysis of patients with an observation time of at 
least 12 hours (795 in total) led to similar results and is therefore not reported. 
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Table 1. Characteristics of 378 patients from 57 intensive care units 
 
 Count (%) or mean ± SD 
Patients  
Age (years) 60.3 ± 19.1 
Female (%) 141 (37.3) 
Male (%) 237 (62.7) 
No. of tubes, lines, drains, etc. per patient  4.7 ± 2.1 
No. of medications (applications) per patient 49.4 ± 27.2 
NEMS score (points) per patient 35.5 ± 11.5 
ICUs  
No. (%) by type of unit  
Mixed 25 (43.9) 
Medical 16 (28.1) 
Surgical  12 (21.1) 
Pediatric 2 (3.5) 
Other 2 (3.5) 
No. (%) by unit size (beds)  
<8 13 (22.8) 
8-12 27 (47.4) 
>12 17 (29.8) 
No. (%) by hospital size (beds)*:  
<400 17 (29.8) 
400-900 23 (40.4) 
>900 14 (24.6) 
No. of physicians 12.6 ± 7.1 
No. of nurses 41.6 ± 26.3 
No. of patients (during 48h period) 6.6 ± 4.7 
Safety climate total score 49.7 ± 19.0 
Unit occupancy (0-1) 0.79 ± 0.19 
Physicians to patient ratio (0-1) 0.35 ± 0.25 
Nurses to patient ratio (0-1) 0.80 ± 0.43 
Total no. of tubes, etc. per nurse 8.40 ± 4.60 
Total no. of medications per nurse 66.79 ± 35.02 
Total NEMS score (points) per patient  68.10 ± 35.60 
ICUs with CIRS 33 (57.9) 
ICUs with regular safety audit 11 (19.3) 
ICUs with barcodes or other electronic measures 
designed to prevent medication errors 
14 (24.6) 
ICUs with checklists 51 (89.5) 
Error rate (no. of patients with errors / all patients) 0.44 ± 0.32 
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Data collection 
A study manual and all questionnaires were made available in German on the study website 
(www.sifim.org). Detailed handbooks as well as simulated training sessions were provided to all 
participants. Additional support and supervision was offered during data collection. Data collection 
itself was highly standardized in order to reduce the risk of errors. For each patient observed, basic 
demographic characteristics (age, sex) were recorded by staff on a form, along with the start and 
end of the individual observation period. Throughout that time, the form remained at the patient 
position and was used to record the occurrence of any of the predefined medical errors relating to 
the patient concerned, irrespective of the staff member recording them. Every contributor to the 
questionnaire could see all previous entries, making duplicate reporting highly unlikely. In 
addition, each ICU staff member was asked to fill in the safety climate questionnaire available on 
the study website. For both patients and medical personnel, data acquisition and reporting were 
anonymous. Last but not least, the characteristics of individual ICUs were reported by a designated 
coordinator, who was also responsible for briefing the unit staff, facilitating data collection, and 
transmitting information to the study database. 
Measures 
Concerning the operationalization of “production pressure”, our measure of capacity utilization 
was constructed from three separate indicators expressing the relation between patient numbers 
and resources, as follows: 
• Unit occupancy, defined as the ratio of “bed usage” (sum of all hours of patient observation) to 
“bed potential” (number of ICU beds times 48, the observation period duration in hours); 
• Nurse-to-patient ratio, defined as “total nurse working hours” (mean number of nurses times 
48) divided by “bed usage”; 
• Physician-to-patient ratio, defined by analogy with 2. 
Our workload measure was also composite and based on three indicators, in this case all 
concerned with the level of care provided per patient. They were: 
• The number of medications received by patients in relation to nurse numbers 
• The number of tubes, catheter, probes, lines and/or drains inserted into patients, again in 
relation to nurses. 
• The so called Nine Equivalents of Nursing Manpower Use Score (NEMS; Reis Miranda, 
Moreno, & Iapichino, 1997), made up of: basic monitoring, intravenous medication, mechanic 
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airway, supplementary airway, singular vasoactive medication, multiple vascoactive 
medication, dialysis, specific interventions. 
The composite variable showed no linear correlation with error rates, so its natural logarithm 
was used as a linear correction. The results obtained in both cases were similar. 
On the “protection” side, the safety tools we included correspond to those most commonly 
used in German ICUs, the use of which was measured by means of six categorical (yes/no) 
indicators for each ICU: existence of a mission statement stressing patient safety; regular 
performance of safety audits; implementation of CIRS; regular training to improve patient safety 
as well as implementation of checklists for SOPs and/or barcodes or electronic tools to avoid 
medication errors, the latter two being safety tools directly related to daily medical tasks. 
Concerning the measurement of safety climate, besides operationalizations of safety climate in 
general (e.g., Burke, Sarpy, Tesluk, & Smith-Crowe, 2002; Zohar, 2000), several instruments 
specifically referring to patient safety have been developed (e.g., Colla, Bracken, Kinney, & 
Weeks, 2005; Singer et al., 2007). However, no reliable and valid instrument in German was 
available and a literal translation makes little sense from a methodological point of view (Coyne, 
2001; Hambleton, Merenda, & Spielberger, 2005). This led to the development of the Vienna 
Safety Climate Questionnaire (VSCQ) in an iterative process using data from a total of 1,968 
respondents and including multidimensional scaling (n = 61), item selection (n = 954, including an 
EFA sample with n = 107 and a first CFA sample with n = 847), confirmatory factor analysis 
(second CFA sample, recruited after final item selection n = 761), and validity (included in all 
samples). This process was completed before the current study was conducted. 
Despite going beyond mere translation, the VCSQ is based on existing instruments for 
measuring safety climate (e.g., Colla et al., 2005; Flin, Burns, Mearns, Yule, & Robertson, 2006; 
Schutz, Counte, & Meurer, 2007; Singer et al., 2007; Weingart, Farbstein, Davis, & Phillips, 
2004). Accordingly, the scales included in this study are closely related to extant dimensions of 
safety climate. For instance, taking the PSCHO by Singer and colleagues (e.g., 2007) as a 
reference, Management Commitment to Patient Safety largely corresponds to “Senior managers’ 
engagement”, Organizational Learning to “Learning”, Communication and Cooperation regarding 
Patient Safety to “Fear of shame” and “Fear of blame”, and Attitude toward Safety Management to 
“Overall emphasis on safety” and “Unit safety norms”. 
Despite considerable intercorrelations of the VSCQ scales (see Table 3), a confirmatory factor 
analysis based on three samples (total n = 2,608, with the sample used in the present study 
included) supports the posited dimensions and item allocation, with RMSEA ≤ .05 and χ2/df < 3.6 
in all cases (Browne & Cudeck, 1993). The questionnaire has been successfully validated (Steyrer, 
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Latzke, Pils, Vetter, & Strunk, 2011), and the performance of the VSCQ on relevant psychometric 
criteria (see Table 1) is so satisfactory that it is now listed in the catalogue of safety culture 
instruments used in member states of the European Union compiled by the European Network for 
Patient Safety. 
Although safety climate was ascertained individually it represents a construct on group and/or 
organizational level (here: ICU); the same ultimately applies to error rate (Neal & Griffin, 2006), 
with this study not focussing on the probability of an individual patient encountering a medical 
error but rather the performance of the whole ICU and its relationship to ICU-wide SC and ST. All 
analyses were therefore conducted at ICU level, with aggregated SC scale values. Table 1 shows 
the aggregation indices ICC(1), ICC(k) (notation follows McGraw & Wong, 1996), and the 
interquartile range for rWG(J) for all scales. While using the uniform distribution as reference for the 
rWG(J) calculations makes them upper bound values (LeBreton & Senter, 2008), these values as 
well as the ICC(k) values are well above the commonly cited threshold of 0.7, and ICC(1) well 
above 0.05 (Bliese, 2000; James, Demaree, & Wolf, 1993), suggesting that analysis on an 
aggregate level is appropriate here. 
 
Table 2. Sample items and scale properties for the four VSCQ scales (different n 
apply to consistency and validity criteria as opposed to aggregation indices) 
 
 n = 1,968 n = 734 
1. Management Commitment to Patient Safety 
“Management encourages the staff to report incidents” / “Most 
superiors know that they act as role models regarding safety 
issues” 
Items 10 ICC(1) .19 
Alpha .91 ICC(k) .81 
Vali-
dity 
.40 rWG(J) 
(IQR) 
.83 
.92 
2. Organizational Learning 
“After critical incidents we undertake major efforts to 
investigate the cause” / “We investigate critical incidents to 
draw new conclusions for our actions” 
Items 10 ICC(1) .18 
Alpha .86 ICC(k) .80 
Vali-
dity 
.43 rWG(J) 
(IQR) 
.83 
.92 
3. Communication and Cooperation regarding Patient Safety 
“If someone notices that a colleague makes a mistake it is no 
problem to address it” / “Mistakes are personalized and 
individual persons are charged” (-) 
Items 10 ICC(1) .17 
Alpha .87 ICC(k) .78 
Vali-
dity 
.37 rWG(J) 
(IQR) 
.80 
.90 
4. Attitude toward Safety Management 
“Process quality and error management are rather lip service 
than lived practice” (-) / “Sometimes it seems like a waste of 
time, which is taken for safety efforts without much effect” (-) 
Items 10 ICC(1) .15 
Alpha .82 ICC(k) .76 
Vali-
dity 
.39 rWG(J) 
(IQR) 
.83 
.90 
 
As regards our dependent variable, a medical error was defined, in line with previous studies 
on patient safety in ICUs, as an event that harmed or could have harmed a patient, whether by 
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omission or commission (Thomas et al., 2000). We focused on intensive care routine processes 
and recorded errors in seven distinct categories, based on insights from two previous studies 
(Valentin et al., 2009; Valentin et al., 2006): administration of medication (wrong dose, time and 
medication, wrong means of administration or missed administration) and unplanned dislodgement 
of airways, arterial lines, central venous catheters, urinary catheters, enteral nutrition probes or 
drains. The error rate was the ratio of patients affected by errors in a given ICU to the total 
number of patients in that unit. 
Analysis 
In several other studies on the relationship between safety climate and medical errors the 
occurrence of errors represents a count variable of rare events which is why the authors use 
poisson or negative binomial models to analyze their data (e.g., Hofmann & Mark, 2006; Katz-
Navon et al., 2005; Singer et al., 2009). The distribution of our criterion variable, by contrast, does 
not correspond to a count of rare events, with a median and mean of .44 (s.d. ±.32), a merely 
slightly positive skewness value (.23) and even a negative excess kurtosis (-.94), which is why 
OLS regression and correlations are employed in this study (as for instance in Naveh et al., 2005). 
Based on the correlation results presented in Table 3 we chose the predictors for the regression 
analyses, with a focus on keeping the models parsimonious and minimizing multicollinearity. In 
order to test H4 we conducted Steiger’s Z-test (Steiger, 1980) comparing the (bivariate) effect of 
safety climate on error rate to that of the safety tools. 
Findings 
Bivariate analysis reveals a high intercorrelation between capacity utilization and workload 
(0.72) and of both with error rate (capacity utilization: 0.25, workload: 0.40), which is why we 
only retained workload as a predictor for the following regression analyses. Similarly, while all 
safety climate scales are significantly correlated with error rate, the high intercorrelations of the 
VSCQ scales prompted us to choose Attitude towards Safety Management as safety climate proxy 
for the regression analyses, since this VSCQ dimension corresponds most closely to the definition 
of safety climate presented above. 
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 Table 3. Overview of means, standard deviations, and correlations (ICU level) 
 
 mean (SD) 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 
1. Mgmt. Commitm. to Pat. Saf. -.02 (.58) --            
2. Organizational Learning -.02 (.51) .85 --           
3. Comm. & Coop. reg. Pat. Saf. -.00 (.54) .74 .74 --          
4. Attitude tow. Safety Mgmt. -.00 (.53) .81 .81 .86 --         
5. CIRS .58 (.50) .08 .07 .05 .05 --        
6. regular safety audit .19 (.40) .17 .06 .10 .12 -.03 --       
7. barcodes .25 (.43) -.08 -.08 -.06 -.12 -.01 -.07 --      
8. SOP checklists .89 (.31) .22 .17 .07 .10 -.06 .17 .06 --     
9. training .46 (.50) .24 .25 .12 .12 -.00 .09 .13 .20 --    
10. mission statement .60 (.50) .36 .37 .19 .19 .02 .04 .05 .19 .54 --   
11. capacity utilization .63 (.42) -.19 -.20 -.05 -.28 .00 -.05 .26 -.02 -.02 .12 --  
12. workload -1.80 (.45) -.04 -.14 -.03 -.23 .04 .04 .24 .10 .10 .04 .72 -- 
13. error rate .44 (.32) -.29 -.36 -.26 -.44 .16 .13 .19 -.09 -.08 -.07 .25 .40 
n = 57; correlations ≥ .27 are significant at the 5% level, ≥ .34 significant at the 1% level (two-tailed) 
 
The intercorrelations concerning the use of safety tools are generally much lower, so we 
conducted separate analyses for each safety tool to assess the respective impact of workload, 
safety attitudes and each safety tool on error rate. We ran additional analyses including the number 
of safety tools as a predictor, but this was merely correlated with the individual ST and (like 
mission statements, albeit more weakly) with two SC scales (management commitment and 
organizational learning) but not with either capacity utilization, workload, or error rate. Based on 
the finding by Katz et al. (2005) that in contrast to “optimal” level of detail of safety procedures 
both scarcely and overly detailed safety procedures lead to a higher error rate, we checked for a 
curvilinear relationship between number of tools and error rate, too, but found none. 
Table 4 presents the results of the regression analyses with error rate always the dependent 
variable, and workload, Attitude towards Safety Management, its interaction with the respective 
safety tool and the safety tool main effect as predictors. Both correlation and regression results 
support H1 and H3 (workload increases the error rate, safety climate reduces it) but strongly 
contradict H2: none of the examined safety tools significantly reduces error rate. More precisely, 
there was no significant relationship with error rate for any of the ST, except for a marginally 
significant (2-tailed p < .10) main effect of safety audits opposite to the predicted direction. 
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 Table 4. Regression model results (standardized beta coefficients) 
 
DV: error rate CIRS Audits Training Miss. Stmt. Barcodes Checklists 
Workload  .31 **  .27 **  .32 **  .30 **  .37 **  .33 ** 
SC (Att. tow. Saf. Mgmt.)  -.37 **  -.43 **  -.35 **  -.36 **  -.28 *  -.35 ** 
ST (see respective 
column) 
 .16 †  .21 *  -.06  -.02  .10  -.08 
SC x ST  -.06  -.18 †  -.07  -.15  .24 *  .03 
R2  .32  .34  .30  .31  .34  .30 
** p < .01   * p < .05   † p < .10 (one-tailed) 
 
Consequently, the regression results seem to support H4 as well (SC reduces the error rate 
more than ST). In order to properly test for significance we compared the correlation coefficients 
of SC and ST with error rate; in all instances the difference in favor of SC is significant at the 5% 
level (1-tailed; Steiger’s Z ranges between 2.05 for checklists and 3.26 for CIRS). To check 
whether this difference in effect might be a statistical artefact due to the limited variation of a 
dichotomous variable as opposed to a scale variable, we performed a median split on all SC 
variables and entered them as well as the ST variables into an ANOVA. The respective eta square 
values yield the same picture as the effect size r, suggesting that the observed effects are not a 
result of different scale properties. 
Concerning H5, the results do not support our assumption. There was just one merely 
marginally significant interaction with audits in the predicted direction (one-tailed p < .08), and 
even a “reversed” interaction with barcodes opposite to our assumption (two-tailed p < .07), 
suggesting that barcodes even contribute to an increased error rate in case of a good safety climate. 
Limitations 
While the present study has some strengths, e.g., a prospective designs in which accidents were 
measured following the measurement of safety climate (Clarke, 2006), considering safety climate 
at the clinical area level rather than at the hospital level (Sexton et al., 2006), an absence of 
common method variance, and the introduction of a now recognized German instrument for 
measuring safety climate that can relate to tried and tested instruments for measuring safety 
climate in English (e.g., Schutz et al., 2007; Singer et al., 2007), it has some shortcomings that 
should be considered when interpreting the results, too. First, it is not based on a random sample: 
units were self-selecting in that they chose to respond to the call for participation and had previous 
experience with external studies on medical error in ICUs (Valentin et al., 2009; Valentin et al., 
2006), although not in connection with safety climate and/or tools. As a result, the possibility of 
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sample bias cannot be completely excluded, but such a bias should rather consist in more accurate 
reporting of errors and a better (and/or bounded below) safety climate compared to “average” 
ICUs, which would not weaken our results. Moreover, despite an ex-ante research design 
controlling for a range of variables and modeling the project on state-of-the-art studies in the areas 
of error and safety culture measurement which enabled us to include a great number of potential 
error rate predictors, some degree of distortion from omitted variables cannot be entirely ruled out. 
Concerning staff workload during the observation period, we were unable to record the precise 
number and time of individual treatments (i.e., the exact distribution of workload) and therefore 
have to assume that these were approximately evenly distributed. 
Other conceivable causes of distortion lie in the methods we used to measure safety 
performance and safety climate. Our metric of the former was based on a limited set of error types. 
While these were selected for being the most important ones according to previous studies in ICUs 
(Valentin et al., 2009; Valentin et al., 2006), the inclusion of other types might have produced 
different results. In addition, error incidence was recorded by hospital staff, therefore it is possible 
that some over- or underreporting occurred, although the high values recorded make 
underreporting appear somewhat implausible. Similarly, the VSCQ relies on employees 
responding in a valid and truthful manner, something which cannot be guaranteed; on the other 
hand, the obtained values do not hint at any biases like social desirability or similar and the data 
were regularly verified and checked for any apparent inconsistencies during the execution of the 
study. 
Discussion and Practice Implications 
Our findings for hospital care in ICUs support the notion of a production vs. protection trade-
off in two ways. First, while it is arguably possible to implement measures that increase both 
efficiency and safety (as mentioned above in connection with Lean Healthcare), simply aiming at 
“doing more with less” obviously comes with a safety penalty, as reflected in the considerable 
effect of staff workload on error rate. Second, safety culture can apparently thwart the detrimental 
effects of increased workload on safety quite effectively. However, corroborating the findings by 
Khatri et al. (2007), a management approach relying on safety tools and procedures to compensate 
for the erosion of safety margins by increased production pressure might rather abet than abate 
medical errors. 
Regarding any interaction between safety climate and safety tools, our findings were generally 
weak. For the two “climate-related” tools (mission statements and safety audits), only the 
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implementation of a mission statement was significantly correlated with some of the SC 
dimensions, and interactions with safety climate, although in the predicted direction, failed to 
reach statistical significance for our sample. The same applies to an even larger extent to the safety 
tools aimed at learning and increased awareness (training and CIRS), where no interaction was 
found at all. Concerning training as ascertained in our study, we argue that it consists mainly in 
off-the-job “ground school” lessons, representing individual “single-loop learning” which is just a 
precursor of “double-loop learning” that takes place and becomes effective on an organizational 
level (Argyris, 1982). CIRS, on the other hand, represents such double-loop learning, but still 
failed to interact with safety climate in the predicted way. One possible explanation for this is that 
CIRS in hospitals is still in a somewhat exploratory phase, especially that staff might not (yet) trust 
it to be positively anonymous and non-punitive, since it is administered and evaluated by 
management. A similar observation was made in another high-hazard industry, where the Aviation 
Safety Reporting System (ASRS), now a valued and effective safety tool, initially failed to work 
until its anonymity and non-punitive nature were clearly and credibly established by introducing a 
neutral organization functioning as a broker, with the supervisory authorities having strictly no 
access to any clues concerning the identity of the reporting persons (Stolzer, Halford, & Goglia, 
2011, p. 57f.). 
By contrast, checklists and barcodes address daily work routines in a highly structured and 
rigid manner. Here, the marginally significant interaction found in our data for use of barcodes 
(i.e., it lowers the error rate in case of a poor SC but contributes to an augmentation of errors in 
ICUs with a good SC) may hint at staff not using the implemented technology in case of a weak 
safety climate, therefore detecting less errors, while in case of a sound safety climate, staff may be 
more likely to use the available technology because they recognize its role in promoting safety, 
and, as a result, detect more errors. Another possible explanation relating to the finding by Katz-
Navon et al. (2005) that overly detailed safety procedures increase the number of medical errors 
could be that in units with a firm safety attitude the implementation of barcodes represents an 
additional burden (despite falling slightly short of statistical significance for two-tailed testing, 
barcodes are the only ST with an appreciable relationship to workload and capacity utilization) but 
actually serves as a barrier against errors in the absence of such an emphasis on safety. The failure 
to find any comparable (or contrasting) effect for checklists might be largely rooted in the fact that 
almost all participating ICUs used checklists (see bottom of Table 2), making this safety tool more 
of a constant than a variable. 
In conclusion, besides underscoring the importance of a sound safety climate to prevent a 
decline in patient safety resulting from increased production pressure, our findings support the 
 
[15] 
 
 
view that safety is created at the “sharp end” (Dekker, 2006), consequently strongly cautioning 
against a “shortcut” approach of trying to achieve safety via prodecures and policies implemented 
top-down. 
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